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RECENT DECISIONS
cause of the unjust conviction? Natural justice rebels at such a
thought. Nevertheless, such a result would follow if coram nobis were
unavailable as only a presidential pardon, an avenue discretionary if
not doubtful, could erase the felonious brand,
Certain undesirable consequences are foreseeable as a result of
the instant decision. Litigation often will not come to an end once
and for all as it should. Many unfounded or fabricated petitions will
undoubtedly find their way into the courts and serve to hamper the
administration of justice. Notwithstanding these consequences, fun-
damental rights must be assured in criminal proceedings. One of
these, the Sixth Amendment, is not a procedural formality and
".... stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional safe-
guards it provides be lost, justice will not 'still be done.' "50
MILITARY LAw-CoURTS-MARTIAL-JUISDICTION TO TRY Dis-
CHARGED SERVICEMEN.- United States military authorities arrested
the accused, an honorably discharged veteran, for the murder of a
Korean national allegedly committed while the accused was in service.
He was immediately flown to Korea, where the crime took place, to
stand trial in a military court pursuant to Article 3 (a) of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. The District Court for the District of
Columbia, on petition, granted a writ of habeas corpus 1 and ordered
his release.2 Reversing this order, the Court of Appeals held that
Article 3(a) is a valid exercise of the congressional power to enact
rules regulating the armed services, and, further, that the due process
clause does not require a hearing before the removal of the accused
to the place of trial. Talbott v. Toth, No. 11964, D.C. Cir., March
25, 1954.
Originally, the United States Army,3 Navy,4 and Coast Guard 5
had separate systems of courts-martial. Under these systems, the
military courts could not try a civilian not connected with the mili-
tary, except during periods when martial law had been imposed upon
a specific area.6 Moreover, the courts' jurisdiction over a member of
50 See Allen v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 866, 868 (N.D. Ill. 1952).
I Toth v. Talbott, 113 F. Supp. 330 (D.D.C. 1953).
2 Toth v. Talbott, 114 F. Supp. 468 (D.D.C. 1953).
341 STAT. 787 (1920), 10 U.S.C. § 1471 et seq. (1946) (Articles of War-
also applicable, in amended form, to Air Force).
4 12 STAT. 600 (1862), 34 U.S.C. § 1200 (1946) (Articles for the Govern-
ment of the Navy).
5 34 STAT. 200 (1906), as amended, 14 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1946) (Disci-
plinary Law of the Coast Guard).
6 See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U.S. 1866).
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the armed forces ceased with his honorable discharge. 7 Even re-entry
of the individual into military service did not remove this immunity.8
However, if a discharge were obtained by fraud,9 or if the crime
charged were defrauding the Government,1 ° the military courts could
entertain jurisdiction to prosecute these frauds.
In 1950, Congress enacted the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice," which not only unified and codified the penal systems of the
various services but also included some notable additions.12 One of
these, Article 3(a), extends the power of military courts to try a
veteran for a crime committed while he was in service. Under this
article, a veteran is subject to military prosecution provided: (1) the
offense was committed while he was subject to the Code; (2) the
federal, state or territorial courts do not have jurisdiction of the
offense; (3) the offense is punishable by a sentence of at least five
years; 13 and (4) the action is brought within the applicable period of
limitations.14
The instant case decided that under Article 3(a) an accused ex-
serviceman can be removed to the place where the offense was com-
mitted, without any preliminary hearing. The Court, rejecting the
defendant's contention that such procedure violated due process, noted
that although such a safeguard is sometimes provided for by statute,15
it is not always required by the Constitution.'" A further constitu-
tional question raised was whether an accused was entitled to indict-
ment by a grand jury before he could be tried.17 However, the
exception under the Fifth Amendment relating to "cases arising in
the land or naval forces" was deemed applicable here. Following
prior decisions,' 8 the Court concluded that a "case arises" when the
7 See M sher v. Hunter, 143 F.2d 745, 746 (10th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 800 (1945); Ex parte Drainer, 65 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Cal. 1946),
aff'd inem. sub nom. Gould v. Drainer, 158 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1947); United
States ex rel. Viscordi v. MacDonald, 265 Fed. 695 (E.D.N.Y. 1920) ; United
States ex rel. Santantonio v. Warden, 265 Fed. 787 (E.D.N.Y. 1919).
8 United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949).
9 41 STAT. 805 (1920), 10 U.S.C. § 1566 (Supp. 1951), United States
ex rel. Marino v. Hildreth, 61 F. Supp. 667 (E.D.N.Y. 1945).20 Kronberg v. White, 84 F. Supp. 392 (N.D. Cal. 1949), aff'd sub non.
Kronberg v. Hale, 180 F.2d 128 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 969 (1950).
1164 STAT. 107 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (Supp. 1952).
12 Under Article 27(b) it is required that both the trial counsel and de-
fense counsel be lawyers. The Court of Military Appeals, the highest mili-
tary tribunal, is to be composed of civilians (Article 67).
1364 STAT. 109 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §553 (Supp. 1952).
14 64 STAT. 121 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §618 (Supp. 1952).
15 FED. R. CRIM. P. 40.
1°See United States ex rel. Kassin v. Mulligan, 295 U.S. 396, 400 (1935);
United States ex rel. Hughes v. Gault, 271 U.S. 142, 149 (1926).
17 U.S. CONST. AMEND. V.
28 See Kronberg v. Hale, 180 F.2d 128 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
969 (1950); In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas. 796, No. 1596 (C.C.D. Cal. 1873);
United States ex reL. Marino v. Hildreth, 61 F. Supp. 667 (E.D.N.Y. 1945);
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crime is committed, and not when formal proceedings are commenced.
Since the crime was committed while Toth was in the service, he
was not entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment as applied
to military personnel.
Quite apart from the merit of Article 3(a) as an expedient
measure, and apart from trying, in a military court, a veteran who
obtained his discharge through fraud, the constitutionality of the
article is not well settled. The Court, in the instant case, must have
thought that Article 3 (a) is a valid and desirable extension of mili-
tary jurisdiction, since the statute supplies a forum for the prosecu-
tion of alleged crimes which, under the old articles of war, would
have been barred by the discharge of a person from military service.19
However, even in relation to ex-servicemen, it is submitted that due
process would require that they be given a preliminary hearing to
determine whether they come within the scope of Article 3 (a).20
M
TAXATION- TERmINABLE TRUST WITH VESTED RE:MAINDER
INCLUDABLE IN GROSS ESTATE.-In an action for an estate tax refund,
the executors contended that the Internal Revenue Commissioner
erred, in that he included in decedent's gross estate the corpora of
irrevocable trusts established by decedent. The beneficiaries had a
vested interest in the trust principal, but the settlor, who was also the
trustee, had the power to terminate the trusts prior to the expiration
date. The Supreme Court, in affirming the Commissioner's deter-
mination, held that the decedent retained the power to "alter, amend
or revoke" within the meaning of Section 811 (d) (2) of the Internal
Revenue Code, and hence the trust corpora were properly includable'
in the gross estate. Lober v. United States, 74 Sup. Ct. 98 (1953).
The present estate tax is derived from the Revenue Act of 1916,1
which made only oblique reference to trusts, including in the gross
estate any interest ". . . with respect to which ... [the decedent] has
created a trust .. . intended to take effect in possession or enjoy-
Terry v. United States, 2 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Wash. 1933); Ex parte Joly,
290 Fed. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).1 9 See United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949).20 Senator McCarran, in March of 1950, introduced a bill to amend the
Uniform Code of Military Justice which provided that a person arrested within
the continental limits of the United States or its territories or possessions,
shall be taken without delay to the nearest District Court for a removal hear-
ing. Senate Introductory Bill, S. 3188. See Brief for Appellee, p. 14, Toth
v. Talbott, No. 11964, D.C. Cir., March 25, 1954.
139 STAT. 756 (1916). Federal estate taxes had previously existed during
periods of national emergency. See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
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